When asked why humans have language, I heard a professor state that “Language evolved because it was beneficial to human flourishing. It was better to have language than to not have language.” This kind of ad hoc reasoning forms the basis of all so-called Natural Selection explanations proffered by secular academics, and indicates the great decline in contemporary thought. Consider, for a moment, if you, the reader, asked me why I have eyes, and I responded by saying: “Because it’s better than not having eyes.” Could you take me seriously? Sure, you might agree that it is better to have eyes than to not have eyes, but why would you say such a thing? Because you have eyes and could not envision yourself living without eyes. But if you did not have eyes, would you be at such a great disadvantage? After all, are there not animals whose vision is significantly worse than our own, who nonetheless function very well in their own natural environments? This is the problem for the evolutionist: If we have only experienced life with eyes, is it even possible to judge that life without eyes would be worse? What if prior to having eyes our lives were better? The canned answer from evolutionists is basically this: “It is better to have x than not have x, and this is because if we did not have x it would not be as good as having x.”
See the problem?
The evolutionist’s response is not only circular, but assumes knowledge of what life would be like for a creature to not have some property x, despite the fact the only available examples of ~x creatures are those which have become ~x by accident, being wounded, or being born that way (i.e. disadvantageous genetic mutations, deformities, etc). It is reasonable to suppose that for a creature which is supposed to have x not having x would contribute to his not having a very good chance of survival, but this is, to be frank, a concession. For this amounts to saying that creatures who are supposed to have x but do not are unable to function in the way they are supposed to function. The category error should not be brushed away lightly. The evolutionist is equating the experiences of an ~x creature in our own time with an ~x creature of another time. This is a category error (present ~x & past ~x). Additionally, the evolutionist is equating the unnatural ~x creature with the natural ~x creature. This, too, is a category error. While there is superficial resemblance between the unnatural/present day ~x creature and the natural/past ~x creature, in other words, the resemblances cannot be grounds for asserting that the advantages and disadvantages of one are equivalent to those of the other.
Consider, furthermore, that the addition and/or subtraction of properties for any purpose is a telos. Even under an evolutionary paradigm, therefore, the creature’s life and life changes are teleological. Teleology, however, is mind-dependent. Whose mind is it, then, which determined the specific end for which all things supposedly came into being? The question cannot be simply shrugged off by the evolutionist. For if creatures evolve in order to do y, then creatures evolve for a purpose. Why this purpose rather than another?
The evolutionist can offer no answers to these basic questions. More often than not, such questions are entirely ignored or are identified as pointless speculative endeavors. Hardly the stuff of rigorous methodology and academic seriousness, if you ask me.